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MICHAEL D. WAGNER
“A FEW DAYS LATER IN COMING”
MAJOR GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT’S ROLE IN THE
AROOSTOOK WAR
Maine Soldier’s Song
We are marching on to Madawask,
To fight the trespassers;
We 'll teach the British how to walk,
And come off conquers.
We 'll have our land right good and clear,
For all the English say;
They shall not cut another log
Nor stay another day.
They better march and stay at home,
And mind their business there;
The way we treated them before,
Made all the nations stare.
We 'll feed them well with ball and shot,
We 'll cut these Red-coats down,
Before we yield to them an inch,
Or title of our ground.
Onward! my lads so brave and true
Our country's right demands
With justice, and with glory fight,
For these Aroostook lands.1
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Jo h n M itchell’s m ap o f 1755, used during the treaty negotiations betw een the U nited
States and G reat Britain after the Revolutionary War, provided no geographical basis for
determ ining the location o f the St. Croix River o r the “highlands” that separated the
rivers diat flowed into the Atlantic from those that flowed into the St. Lawrence. M aine’s
boundaries were left vague until the issue was setded in 1842.
Henry S. Burrage, M AINE IN TH E N O R TH E A ST BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY (1919).
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“The members was [sic] ordered to appear at this place on
Wednesday the 20th day of February [1839] at 8 o ’clock AM
armed and equipped as the law directs with 3 days provisions and
blankets and 24 ball cartridges.”2 With this order, read before its
twenty-nine assembled members, the Bangor Rifle Corps mobi
lized for war with New Brunswick. Only two weeks earlier, the
unit met to elect William H. Mills to serve as captain of the
company.3 Now the entire unit was on the march, just one of the
forty-six companies mobilized from Maine’s militia to defend the
northeastern boundary. Although history has obscured the
significance of the Aroostook War, the conflict threatened to
spark a third war between the United States and Great Britain in
the course of a generation. Between 1837 and 1839, several
skirmishes occurred along the border from Ohio to Maine; many
dissidents saw this growing discord as a call to arms to expel
Great Britain forever from the North American continent. That
the United States avoided this unfortunate course of action
depended to a large extent on President Martin Van Buren’s best
trouble shooter, Major General Winfield Scott. Called to the
border to soothe tensions, Scott combined a credible military
threat with his reputation as a pacifier to quell the dispute and
establish a lasting basis for settlement.
Troubles between the people of the United States and
Great Britain were renewed during the 1837 French-Canadian
revolt against British rule. New Brunswick at this time was still
a colony of Great Britain, and it was the British military that acted
to keep order. British subjects easily accepted this relationship,
but French descendants continued to seek autonomy. President
Martin Van Buren issued a proclamation dem anding the neutral
ity of United States citizens during the revolt, but this had little
effect. American agitators along the border often aided the
French Canadians and continued to arm themselves for war.4
This history of tension between the United States and Great
Britain gave Maine’s mobilization considerably more support
than it normally should have gathered. Maine’s governor, John
Fairfield, a Boston editor reasoned, had it “in his power to
become second only to Moses and Washington....In six months,
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he may with ease overrun the whole of Canada, and in six m onths
more organize it as a Republican Governm ent, and become
himself its President, or divide it into three or four Republican
States, and jo in our Federal U nion.”5 While an exaggeration of
Maine’s military potential, the editorial nevertheless suggests the
broader intentions of some of the conflict’s supporters. Presi
dent Van B uren’s woes were com pounded by M aine’s determ i
nation to settle the dispute by military means. Van Buren
realized that if the forces of Maine and New Brunswick collided
on the border, the conflict could not be confined to the disputed
territory. His only chance for success rem ained a settlem ent
without a clash of arms.
he roots of the boundary conflict date back to die
end o f the Revolutionary War. The 1783 Treaty of
Paris established the border based upon the 1755
map by John Mitchell (see map 1). However, when Mitchell drew
the map he had only a vague geographical knowledge of the
region. Several incorrectly plotted river courses left the treaty

T

In 1839 G overnorJohn Fairfield (left) sent
Land Agent Rufus M clntire (right) into the
disputed territory to break up the camps m ade by trespassing loggers. M clntire was
captured by New Brunswickers and jailed in Fredericton. Buirage, M AIN E IN TH E
N O RTH EAST BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY; John Francis Sprague, “The North Eastern
Boundary Controversy and the Aroostook War" in COLLECTIONS OF TH E PISCATAQUIS
COUNTY HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 1910).
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open to interpretation along the Maine-New Brunswick border.
This contested area became of great significance to Great
Britain, since it included the only winter supply line between
New Brunswick and Quebec. Britain feared that should war
again develop between the two nations, the United States would
be in an easy position to cut off communication between the
maritime and inland provinces.6
To further inflame the dispute, the territory comprised
2,905 square miles of valuable pineland. Maine’s lumber pro
duction was second in the nation by 1820, and the state sought
more timberland for its voracious mills. New Brunswick’s
lumber trade experienced similar growth.7 The conflict over
timber escalated in January 1839 when Governor Fairfield
ordered a civil posse into the territory to “break up the camps,
and disperse those [New Brunswickers] who are engaged in the
work of devastation and pillage.”8 The Maine Legislature sent
State Land Agent Rufus Mclntire and a posse o f200 men into the
territory. Although the posse traveled as a civil force, it brought
along a brass six-pounder cannon to ensure that the New
Brunswickers listened.9
New Brunswick’s lieutenant governor, John Harvey, pub
lished an official proclamation expressing dissatisfaction with
the posse’s presence in the disputed territory. Harvey took
special care in this m em orandum to address himself as a major
general and com m ander in chief of New Brunswick’s forces,
titles that indicated his willingness to use military force. In the
same order, Harvey called out troops sufficient to repel the
“foreign invasion” by Maine. He also prepared to mobilize the
constitutional militia force of New Brunswick, “should occasion
require.”10
In the disputed territory, a group of fifty Canadian lumber
men captured Mclntire during the night and escorted him to a
jail in Fredericton. Receiving diis news, Fairfield ordered
another 200 men to the region. In a private letter, Fairfield
claimed that “We experienced no difficulties in procuring men
to go on this service against the trespassers. On the contrary, it
is hard work to keep them back.” He ordered the Maine posse
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Following M clntire:s capture, G overnor Fairfield called for a fortified position in
Towship 10, at present-day Masardis. State and province began preparations for war.
Wilbur Curtiss map of the Disputed Territory (1839)
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to fortify at Township no. 10 (see map 2) and then appointed
Charles Jarvis to replace Mclntire as the acting State Land
Agent.11
Jarvis’ appointm ent as land agent was significant. Unlike
Mclntire, he was a colonel in the militia. Although Jarvis was
officially acting in a civilian position, Maine no longer expected
a peaceful settlement. Fairfield mobilized another 850 infantry
men and 150 artillerymen for three-months service on the
border to support the posse. Major General Isaac Hodsdon took
command of the militia and prepared to march to the Aroostook.12
The relations between Maine and New Brunswick rapidly
deteriorated as both sides mobilized for war. Harvey demanded
Fairfield recall the Maine forces: “Otherwise, I have no alterna
tive but to take military occupation of that territory.”13 Threat
followed threat. Dispatches from the border reported the arrival
of the 36th British Regiment from the West Indies, with three
more regiments expected. That same day, Fairfield ordered all
10,343 members of the Maine militia to prepare for an immedi
ate call to arms. The Maine Legislature appropriated $800,000
to carry out Fairfield’s resolve to remove all British trespassers
from Maine territory. Fairfield immediately requested help
from President Van Buren, and the legislatures of Ohio, New
York, Illinois, Alabama, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Indi
ana, Massachusetts, and Kentucky all promised aid.14
ince the 1837 French Canadian Revolt, Van Buren
had employed Major General Scott along the North
American border from Ohio to Vermont. As com
manding general of the Eastern Division, Scott moved constantly
among the states to m onitor troubles and keep the peace. His
position often brought him into contact with British authorities,
and he earned among them a reputation for integrity. Scott was
acting in this role when the crisis on the Maine-New Brunswick
border began.15
Van Buren immediately ordered Scott back to Washing
ton.16 The president believed Scott’s involvement was necessary
to prevent a war most observers saw as inevitable. Scott traveled
for three days to reach Washington, and during that time

S
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Secretary of StateJohn Forsyth and British Prime Minister Henry
S. Fox com m unicated frequently. On February 27 they pro
posed a settlem ent known as the Fox-Forsyth agreem ent: “H er
Majesty’s officers will not seek to expel, by military force, the
arm ed party which as been sent by Maine into the district
bordering on the Aroostook River; but the G overnm ent of
Maine will, voluntarily, and without needless delay, withdraw,
beyond the bounds of the disputed territory, any arm ed force
now within them .”17 Although the two nations agreed on paper,
the difficult task of keeping Maine and New Brunswick at peace
would rest on Scott’s shoulders.

As tensions m ounted
on die Maine frontier,
President Van Buren
o rd ered Scott to
W ashington. Scott left
for Augusta with
orders to restore
peace and “enforce
the determ ination o f
die G overnm ent.”
William M. Holland,
TH E LIFE AND
POLITICAL
OPINIONS OF
M A R T IN V A N B U R E N
(1835).

Van B uren’s decision to use Scott was well calculated. At six
feet, five inches and two hundred and eighty pounds, S tott fit the
image of a general. His tradem ark uniform s, covered with braid,
and his cocked hat with large white ostrich plumes com pleted the
look and earned him his nickname, “Old Fuss and Feathers.”
Scott was also well respected on both sides of the Atlantic.
During the War o f 1812, he earned a reputation as a military
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genius. His prior experience in settling conflicts on the northern
border also weighed into Van Buren’s decision. British officials
were willing to negotiate with him, and should these negotiations
fail, the army would benefit from his military expertise.18 No one
was more qualified to take command of the 60,000 soldiers in the
federal forces and state militias.
Van Buren’s use of Scott was also linked to the president’s
concern to reduce partisan bickering over the northeastern
boundary. The Whig general had aided the Democratic presi
dent in lobbying members of Congress in past instances, and in
Maine, partisanship was indeed high. Democrats controlled all
three branches of the state government after 1838, but their hold
was precarious. By sending a Whig to negotiate, Van Buren
hoped that he would reduce the suspicions of ulterior political
motives.19
However, it was Scott’s position as military com m ander on
the scene that served as the deciding factor for peace. Edward
Mansfield, Scott’s official biographer, made the claim in 1848
that “the questions of peace or war have much oftener depended
on the conduct of military officers on the frontiers, dian they
have on any negotiations.”20 Mansfield asserts that negotiations
could have preceded without Scott, provided both states were
willing to settle peacefully. His role then, as commanding
general, was to use his clout to stay a military confrontation on
the border long enough for politicians to settle the dispute.
Scott’s long friendship with Lieutenant Governor Harvey
buttresses this conclusion. The two men served opposite each
other for a time as adjutants in the War of 1812 and often
corresponded officially. Once during battle, an American force
cut Harvey off from his party. As a soldier prepared to take aim,
Scott knocked the rifle from his hand and commanded, “Don’t
kill our prisoner!” Harvey subsequently escaped, but Scott’s
order saved his life. Since that time, both men had privately
corresponded.21
Upon his arrival in Washington, Scott remained for several
days to help pass two bills through the Senate to increase federal
military support. On February 28, Congress voted to give Van
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Buren power to call all military and naval forces of the United
States into service as he “deem ed it advisable.”22 Congress also
authorized Scott to extend the militia’s time of service from three
to six m onths and appropriated $10 million to carry out the
resolutions.
hen Van Buren sent Scott to Maine, his exact
charge was to restore peace and “enforce the
determ ination of the G overnm ent.” Secretary
of War Joel Poinsett authorized Scott to use regular army troops
and the com bined militias of Maine and Massachusetts. As the
Army’s most distinguished general, Scott symbolized a strong
military position, yet his reputation as a “pacificator” reduced
the sense of threat in Great Britain.23 With the Fox-Forsyth
agreem ent in hand and backed with the extended powers of the
military, Scott left for Maine. His parting words to President Van
Buren seemed almost prophetic: “Mr. President, if you want
war, I need only look on in silence. The Maine people will make
it for you fast and hot enough. I know them; but if peace be your
wish, I can give no assurance of success. The difficulties in its way
will be form idable.” Van Buren responded: “Peace with h onor.”24
On his way to Maine, Scott stopped in Boston to secure the
aid of Massachusetts. There G overnor Edward Everett greeted
him warmly. In a special m eeting with the Executive Council,
Everett first praised Scott’s skill as a com m ander and then closed
with his prom ise of “the firm support of the Com m onwealth of
Massachusetts.” This gave m ore credibility to Scott’s position as
a military com m ander. Scott arrived in Portland, Maine, on
March 6,1839, to cheering crowds. Many o f his old soldiers from
the War of 1812 were on hand and fully expected him to again
take com m and against the British.25 However, word of the
Fox-Forsyth agreem ent had already reached Maine, and the
rum ors of Scott’s peaceful intentions caused an uproar within
the state. Maine was not about to let his presence ruin its war.
O ne State Senator declared:
If the contem plated visit o f General Scott to
Maine is only to persuade a withdrawal of our
troops from the disputed territory, or a relin

W
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quishm ent of our present position, he might as
well stay away. I had rather see the State deluged
in blood, and every field bleached with the bones
of our citizens, than should we retrace our foot
steps and submit to British arrogance!26
Maine opposed the wording of the Fox-Forsyth agreement,
which called on the state to withdraw its troops but did not
require reciprocal action by New Brunswick. The citizens of
Maine were told to leave the area before New Brunswick ex
pelled them by force; Washington sold them out. Sentiment to
keep the militia on the border remained strong, and newspapers
fueled the fires of public passion.27 In Maine, Scott discovered
that Major General Hodsdon received orders to march up the
Aroostook Road and establish defensive positions along the
route. Maine had already activated six of its eight divisions, and
troops were massing on the border. The state and providence
were fast approaching actual hostilities. Scott wrote later: had “I
been a few days later in coming to the scene, the troops of the two
countries would have crossed bayonets on the disputed terri
tory.”28
A day after his arrival, Scott’s orders arrived from Secretary
of War Poinsett directing him to confer with the governor of the
state. General Alexander Macomb, the commanding general of
the Army and Scott’s immediate superior, ordered all regular
forces that could be collected to the border to aid Scott. With the
combined federal forces and the militias of Maine and Massachu
setts at Scott’s disposal, Van Buren expected to enforce the
governm ent’s will. Scott, however, was to “abstain from all
armed interference, and from entering the disputed territory for
any other purpose than to restore peace.”29
Poinsett’s order became an im portant part of Scott’s strat
egy for dealing with Maine and New Brunswick. Poinsett only
authorized him to use force to defend the nation, yet the Maine
militia expected him to take immediate command of its forces.
On the New Brunswick side, Harvey respected Scott’s talents as
a general, yet trusted him as a negotiator and friend. Scott played
to the expectations of both sides. To Maine he appeared as the
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com m anding general from W ashington, ready to lead M aine’s
forces to victory. To New Brunswick, his constant reassurances
buttressed his role as the “pacificator” of the dispute.

M aine’s leaders saw Scott as a military hero ready to protect the state’s boundary claims;
to New Brunswickers, Scott stressed his role as a “pacificator.”
Edward D. Mansfield, TH E LIFE OF GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT (1846).

The First Artillery Regiment of the United States Army,
previously stationed in Burlington, Verm ont, established a post
at H oulton to support Scott. To counter M aine’s force, New
Brunswick had the British 69th and the 36th regim ents garri
soned at Woodstock, New Brunswick, supported by portions of
the royal and militia artillery. The C anadian 11th Regim ent was
also ordered to report.30 The dispute was escalating to a national
level, and Scott well understood the dangers.
From his headquarters in Augusta, Scott conveyed to
Poinsett his apprehensions about the Maine militia on the
b o rder and the state’s dissatisfaction with the Fox-Forsyth Agree
ment. However, since no conflict had yet occurred, he believed
he had gained time enough to urge “m oderate counsels.” He
speculated that Harvey held off his troops for one o f two reasons:
Either he waited on the arrival o f m ore forces, or he wanted to
watch the actions of Maine before proceeding.31 Either way,
Scott recognized his only chance to avoid war was to delay any
border engagem ent. Once fighting began, there would be little
chance of stopping it.
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To maintain this delicate course, he next turned to the
Maine state legislature. His appearance before the body drew
numerous onlookers. Scott thanked the audience for its “hearty
reception,” and proclaimed that should war come, he would “be
glad to be found shoulder to shoulder - breast to breast - with
such soldiers.”32 These were the words Maine waited to hear:
Scott was willing to lead the fight, should it be necessary.
cott wrote his first letter to Governor Harvey on
March 9, renewing their friendship. Although he
addressed his letter from “Army Headquarters,” he
displayed a clearly peaceful aim. He expressed his sincere hope
that their “personal friendship, commenced in the field, and in
opposite ranks,” would be “conductive to the preservation of
peace.”33 Scott fully explained Maine’s grievances with the
Fox-Forsyth Agreement and proposed that Harvey rescind his
threat to expel the Maine militia by force. He added that Maine
felt the need to retain the posse in the disputed territory; if New
Brunswick agreed to this point, a peaceful setdem ent could
surely be arranged. To give further assurance of the peaceful
nature of his presence, he ended the letter: “I will add, that I have
not assumed, and do not expect to assume, any command over
the forces which Maine has in the field; and if we can avoid
collision on the northeastern frontier, it is not likely that the
United States will proceed to levy a single regiment under a
recent act of Congress.”34
Harvey established a relay of messengers from the provin
cial light dragoons that allowed correspondence to travel from
his capital in Fredericton to Augusta in only six hours.35 Con
stant communication followed. Within days, both Harvey and
Fairfield appeared ready to accept Scott’s compromise on the
original Fox-Forsyth agreement. The only remaining danger was
that someone on either side would disobey orders and fire across
the border. Scott personally sent letters to officers on the border
extending his confidence they would act “to maintain the faith of
the United States.”36
On March 21, less than three weeks after his arrival, Scott
wrote the final draft of the peace proposal. With only minor

S
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exceptions it was the agreem ent that Fox and Forsyth drew up in
Washington. New Brunswick recanted its threat to expel Maine
from the territory by force and allowed Maine to keep its civil
posse in the area. Both states retained control over the territory
they had effectively controlled before the incident began.37
Bickering continued, but the need for fighting had passed.
Although neither side gained an advantage, each felt that its
honor had been justly defended and considered the “w ar” a
victory. In their orders to withdraw the troops, Fairfield and
Harvey both gave General Scott credit for die peace. Harvey
concluded his letter to Scott: “My reliance upon you, my dear
general, has led me to give you my willing assent to the proposi
tion which you have m ade yourself.”38
Almost three m onths after their mobilization, the m em bers
of the Bangor Rifle Corps returned safely to Bangor to a h ero ’s
welcome. The company clerk reported their arrival “in a m anor
[sic] truly gratifying to our feelings.”39 So ended General
Winfield Scott’s work as the pacifier of M aine’s Aroostook War.
The large military force he secured assured Maine of his readi
ness as com m ander, yet he convinced New Brunswick o f his
peaceful intentions and his determ ination not to take com m and.
Because of his reputation as a negotiator, officials in New
Brunswick trusted his word to seek peace, while the leaders of
Maine waited for him before taking further action toward war.
His well-calculated delay cooled the belligerent states long enough
to allow him a free hand in negotiations. Not a single drop of
blood was spilled over the border. Scott’s reputation as a friend
of peace came to rival his recognition as a com m ander in war.40
Scott’s peaceful settlem ent of the crisis on the northeast
ern border did a great deal to relieve tensions between Britain
and the United States. Formal negotiations between Daniel
W ebster and Lord Alexander A shburton finally resolved the
boundary disputes in 1842. In the W ebster-Ashburton treaty
Maine received a smaller portion of the territory than it had
earlier claimed, but the time for fighting had passed. The
Aroostook “W ar” was over.
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